There have been many multilateral groupings that prospered and lost their relevance with time. The case of BRICS is truly remarkable. Despite several achievements, it began to lose its sparkle but still many countries want to join BRICS.

Internal differences within BRICS -

Diplomatic Bankruptcy —

If India, South Africa, and Brazil within the BRICS expected that China and Russia would fully back their bid to secure membership of the UN Security Council, they were disappointed.

The issue of ‘the aspiration’ of Brazil, India, and South Africa to play a greater role in the UN, figures in every BRICS communiqué, showing the grouping’s utter diplomatic bankruptcy.

China’s Military Assertiveness — Group has seen conflicts such as China’s aggression along the Line of Actual Control which brought India-China relations to their lowest point in several decades.

Russia-China Consolidation — Post Ukraine conflict there has been a consolidation of ChinaRussia cooperation. Other members are finding it difficult to maintain balance between the west and China-Russia.

Trade imbalance with China — All the countries in the BRICS group trade with China more than each other. Therefore, it is blamed as a platform to promote China’s interest. Balancing trade deficit with China is a huge challenge for other partner nations.

China’s push for a common currency — Beijing’s push for a common currency for intra-BRICS trade has also caused inner troubles.

What is the paradox of the BRICS?

Ø  Despite several achievements, cooperation in various fields, the group began to lose its sparkle.

Ø  Apart from internal differences, COVID-19, the Galwan clash, and the Ukraine conflict resulted in increased global economic stress, damaged India-China ties, and turned Russia into a diminishing power.

Ø  The group may have internal differences or lost its Mojo but numerous nations want to become member of BRICS.

Ø  This shows the paradox of BRICS.

Which countries are eager to join BRICS?

Ø  Latin America (4) – Argentina, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Ø  Africa (5) – Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Senegal, and Morocco.

Ø  Asia (10) – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh.

Options for Expansion -

Ø  Mega expansion that raises the membership from five to 21, thus surpassing the G-20.

Ø  Limited admission of 10 new members, two each supported by an existing member.

Ø  Admission of only 5 new members, one each supported by an existing member, with none of the other four using their veto.

Ø  India favours expansion if it is based on agreed criteria and moves gradually.

Ø  If the third option win consensus, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, UAE, and Bangladesh are the most likely states to make the cut.

What could be the rationale behind admission rush?

China’s aspiration to become a global influencer — China is pushing the expansion as a strategic device to extend its global influence.

FOMO (Fear of Missing Out) — The demand to join BRICS stems from FOMO membership of a club that has some visibility.

Prevailing Anti-Western sentiment — Many realise that the doors of other groupings are closed to them. The clamour reflects prevailing anti-western sentiments and a pervasive desire to create a sizeable forum of the Global South.

The new pathway for BRICS -

Expected deliberation on expansion —

Ø  The next BRICS summit will be hosted by South Africa on August 23-24.

Ø  It could take decisions on expansion and its criteria.

Ø  Preparatory meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the National Security Advisers are certain to deliberate on this subject.

Ø  Address the internal imbalance and strengthen the BRICS — When the leaders talk, they should reflect on strengthening BRICS and redressing the internal imbalance.

Conclusion -

Unlike many other multilateral organisations, BRICS is still relevant with some internal differences on key issues. The eagerness to join the group by 19 countries reaffirms the fact that the group has still a lot to offer in terms of geopolitics and economic front as well.

The G7 leaders recently reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and intensified sanctions against Russia while seeking to address differences on dealing with China. The growing alignment between Russia and China indicates a shift towards a bipolar framework, raising questions about India's discourse on a multipolar world.

Different interpretations of Multipolar World -

Ø  Rhetoric against the "collective West" reflects anti-Western sentiment in the Indian elite but lacks understanding of global geopolitical dynamics.

Ø  Analysing the international power structure reveals that the claim of a multipolar world lacks concrete evidence.

Ø  Claims of a multipolar world are often based on the weakening of American power since the post-Soviet era.

Uneven power distribution -

Ø  The EU, while economically powerful, is yet to become a credible geopolitical actor.

Ø  Russia is reasserting itself politically and militarily but remains a weak economic actor.

Ø  Japan, the world's third-largest economy, has limited military power and political will to consider the use of force.

Ø  China is developing comprehensive power comparable to the US, challenging its economic dominance and offering an alternative political and economic model. However, China still lags behind in technological power and military capabilities.

India and other rising powers -

Ø  Countries like India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are rising in the global power hierarchy but have limitations compared to the US and China.

Ø  These rising powers cannot be expected to match the capabilities of the US or China in the near future.

Strategies to balance against dominant powers -

Ø  In the 1990s, strategies emerged to balance against unconstrained US power, leading to India's participation in the RIC and BRICS forums.

Ø  India's decision was influenced by US policies on India's nuclear and missile programs and its involvement in the Kashmir issue.

Changing geopolitical context -

Ø  India’s geopolitical context has significantly evolved since the 1990s.

Ø  The US facilitated India's integration into the global nuclear order, while China has sought to block India's membership in the nuclear suppliers group.

Ø  China poses challenges to India on territorial, economic, and global fronts, while Russia's alignment with China impacts India's strategic calculus.

Conclusion -

India has made significant adjustments to its worldview in response to the challenges posed by China. India's discourse on a multipolar world has transitioned from hedging against US power to balancing against China through initiatives like the Quad and partnerships with the US and its allies. As Asia embraces a bipolar framework, India's foreign policy discourse needs to keep pace with the changing dynamics and continue adapting to address emerging challenges effectively.

European Union and NATO members Estonia and Latvia will soon begin negotiations with Germany’s Diehl Defence for the purchase of IRIS-T SLM air defence system.

About IRIS-T Surface-Launched-Missile (SLM) system:

Ø  The IRIS-T SLM system is a medium-range variant of the IRIS-T SL air defense missile system created by Diehl Defense, a German company.

Ø  This system offers all-around protection, covering a 360° area, against aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and guided weapons.

Ø  It enables the engagement of multiple targets simultaneously, ranging from very short to medium-range, with exceptionally quick response times.

Ø  It is adaptable for both mobile and stationary deployment.

Key Features of the IRIS-T SLM system:

Ø  The system consists of three vehicles: a missile launcher, a radar, and a fire-control radar, along with integrated logistics and support.

Ø  It includes a radar with a range of 250 kilometers (155 miles) for effective surveillance.

Ø  The missiles utilized in the system employ infrared imaging technology to identify targets.

Ø  The missiles have a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles) and can reach a maximum altitude of 20 kilometers (12.4 miles).

The nagging dispute over the water share of the Krishna River between Andhra Pradesh (A.P.) and Telangana remains unresolved, even nine years after the bifurcation of the combined State.

Krishna River

Ø  The Krishna is an east-flowing river.

Ø  Originates at Mahabaleshwar in Maharashtra and merges with the Bay of Bengal

Ø  Flows through Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

Ø  Together with its tributaries, it forms a vast basin that covers 33% of the total area of the four states.

Ø  The principal tributaries joining Krishna are the Ghataprabha, the Malaprabha, the Bhima, the Tungabhadra and the Musi.

Ø  Most of this basin comprises a rolling and undulating country, except for the western border, which is formed by an unbroken line of the Western Ghats.

Ø  The important soil types found in the basin are black soils, red soils, laterite and lateritic soils, alluvium, mixed soils, red and black soils and saline and alkaline soils

Krishna Water dispute

Ø  The States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have been locked in a battle of sorts over the utilisation of Krishna water, with Andhra Pradesh proposing a few projects and in turn, Telangana coming up with half-a-dozen projects of its own.

Ø  Both States have their own justification to pursue new water and power projects as several areas await economic development.

Ø  Rayalaseema is a dry region and it was grievances over poor utilisation of the two rivers in then undivided Andhra Pradesh that was a factor that led to the bifurcation.

Ø  At the same time, the two States should instead focus on water and energy conservation and improving the efficiency of irrigation schemes and hydel reservoirs.

Ø  Telangana had held the view that the notification should flow from finalisation by a tribunal on Krishna water sharing by the two States that would enlarge the scope of reference of the existing Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal (KWDT)-II. Telangana had even moved the Supreme Court but the Centre said it would consider Telangana’s request only if it withdrew its petition which it did.

Water sharing arrangements after bifurcation:

Background:

Ø  The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, did not mention specific water shares since the previous Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal-I (KWDT-I) Award, which was still in force, had not allocated water shares based on regions.

Ø  In 2015, a meeting facilitated by the Ministry of Water Resources resulted in an ad hoc arrangement for water sharing between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

Ad Hoc Water Sharing Arrangement:

Ø  The ad hoc arrangement agreed upon by Telangana and Andhra Pradesh was based on a 34:66 ratio (Telangana:A.P.).

Ø  The minutes of the meeting explicitly stated that this ratio was to be reviewed annually.

Water Resource Management Boards:

Ø  The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act focused on the establishment of two river management boards to manage water resources: the Krishna River Management Board (KRMB) and the Godavari River Management Board (GRMB).

Continuation of Ratio and Opposition:

Ø  The KRMB continued with the 34:66 water sharing ratio each year, despite opposition from Telangana.

Ø  In October 2020, Telangana expressed its demand for an equal share until water shares were officially determined.

Referral to Ministry of Jal Shakti:

Ø  At a recent board meeting, Telangana reiterated its stance for an equal share and declined to continue with the existing arrangement.

Ø  As the member states could not reach an agreement, the matter has been referred to the Ministry of Jal Shakti (MoJS) for resolution.

Claims of Each State:

Telangana:

Ø  Telangana claims that it is entitled to at least a 70% share in the allocation of the 811 tmcft (thousand million cubic feet) of water based on basin parameters.

Ø  It argues that international treaties and agreements on sharing river waters support its claim.

Ø  Telangana points out that Andhra Pradesh (A.P.) has been diverting around 300 tmcft of water from fluoride-affected and drought-prone areas within the basin in Telangana to areas outside the basin.

Andhra Pradesh:

Ø  A.P. also asserts its claim for a higher share of water to protect the interests of command areas that have already been developed.

Ø  The state emphasizes the need to secure water resources for its existing agricultural and irrigation projects.

Stand of the Centre:

Ø  The Centre has convened two meetings of the Apex Council, which includes the Union Minister and Chief Ministers of Telangana and A.P., in 2016 and 2020.

Ø  However, the Centre has not made any substantial effort to address the water sharing issue.

Ø  In 2020, the Ministry of Jal Shakti (MoJS) suggested referring the matter to a Tribunal, and Telangana withdrew its petition from the Supreme Court based on this assurance.

Ø  Despite the passage of over two years, the Centre has not taken any decisive action, leaving the two states in continued dispute over the matter.

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